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THE RAILROADS FACE A CRISIS
By HELMUTH ENGELMAN
WHEN the employees of the nation's railroadsthreatened a strike several months ago, it was
rather apparent that there was a crisis. When
the employees of an industry the size of the railroad
industry threaten a strike, something has to be done.
That brings up the question of what should be done.
The writer feels that whatever needs to be done, it has
very little to do with the wage situation which is
responsible for the present fireworks.
The strike question is very simple. The railroads want
to decrease the wages of their employees by 15%. The
employees do not want to take the wage cut, and made
their threat as a result. That is a simple question. But
the answer, yes, that is something else. However, we
can start with that question and see what it brings up.
Since the carriers brought up the question, we may
start by asking them why. Always first in such a situa-
tion is bad business. Furthermore, say the roads, if the
wage level is kept as high as it is now, the credit of the
companies will be bad. Not only that, but the workers
are on a high enough income now that 15 % reduction
won't hurt. And if the workers really want to know,
if they don't take this cut, it may mean the end of the
railroad industry.
To which the workers reply somewhat as follows:
Business has been bad, yes, but just now, in the past few
months, it has been pretty good, and certainly would
not justify a cut at all. If the carriers think their credit
will become bad, what do they think it is now? As for
wages, the railroad industry is lower paid than any other
major industry. And if the industry goes under, it will
not be because of wages.
This leaves us with really three issues: First, is busi-
ness good or bad? Second, are railroad employees over
or underpaid? Last, just what about this credit and
failing in business we hear about.
The first question seems of least importance. The
writer will admit and even substantiate the fact that
the revenue of the roads has been bad lately, but the
recent upswing, and the size of the drop, would not
seem to justify any 15% cut. This, then, practically
eliminates the most obvious possible answer to the strike
question. This statement is based upon the distribution
of the revenue of the carriers. The laborer's share of
revenue has steadily decreased, and at present, the roads
are getting just about twice as much work per dollar
of wages as they did in 1921. This can be computed
in several ways. If you take gross ton-miles, you can
arrive at a figure of 92% more ton-miles per dollar,
or 101% more per hour of work. (That last brings us
into wage scales, though, which will be discussed later.)
Where, now, the writer would like to ask, is the dif-
ference? Where is the saving? Of course the saving
isn't really quite that much. The tractive force of loco-
motives has increased 48%, which means that the en-
gineer, with; the same pull on the throttle, can pull one
and a half times as hard. The engineer, however, is
not the only man on the road, and such things as the
37% increase in speed, 24% increase in the length of
freight trains, and 15% increase in the capacity of
freight cars would mean at least a certain amount of
increase in the work of the men employed. We can
say that there was a saving of a little over 90% in work
per dollar of pay, but how much is due to technological
advancement, and how much to workers, we'd rather let
the Brookings Institution determine. And after saying
there is a saving that ought to cover what seems like
a temporary slump in business, we can pass on to z few
more vital questions.
The writer admits he is convinced that railroads do
not pay the highest wages, as a whole. The carriers
claim an average wage rate of $1,736 per year. The
workers say it is $1,150. What's the discrepancy? The
answer is in seasonal employment. There are many jobs
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One of thousands
which would be af-
fected by the strike.
on a railroad, like those on a section gang, which last
only for a few months. Of the total employees on the
carriers' payrolls in 1937, 35.3% earned a total of
less than $500, 6.3% got between $500 and $750, etc.
For your information, 49.3% earned less than $1000,
and 14.9% more got less than $1,500, which you may
remember as the Brookings standard of living minimum.
It seems rather obvious, though, that a railroad should
not have to pay a living annual wage for two months'
work by a man that is not worth more than fifty cents
per hour somewhere else. That leaves the worker on
relief, because if he survives the year, he will use up
more than he can ever hope to earn. You and I pay
the difference. With more jobs, the worker thus em-
ployed might spend the rest of his time on a farm, off
relief rolls, but the employment situation at present
makes that sort of thing rather improbable. To be fair,
then, we may say that this seasonal employment ques-
tion is not the railroad problem. We cannot, however,
ignore these workers in our wage rates because they
lower the average hourly rate. The engineer works short
periods, and not a great deal. In monthly pay, he is
really worth the $200 or so he may receive, but he
works relatively few hours, and at a correspondingly
high hourly rate. So, here again we concede to both
sides' and say that the yearly income is between $1,736
and $1,115. That does not get us very far. The workers
have established a comparison, and quote an average in
1920 of 71.1c, and in 1938 of 72.1c, which is not
much increase, as the average hourly wage of em-
ployees. This is less than nineteen other industries pay.
Again we have the problem of determining just how
the railroad average should be determined. It is a rather
common feeling that railroads do not operate a sweat-
shop type of industry, and for that reason, the 72c
sounds all right, especially since it comes from labor.
At forty hours for fifty-two weeks, it is $1,498. As
the writer remembers, that is not excessive, but it com-
pares with the pay of many industries, and there are
many far lower. The conclusion from this is that if
the railroad employee cannot buy enough pork chops
and shoe leather, his misery is at least shared by workers
as a whole, and he is not the only one who would like
more pay. That fact, that everybody, almost, is under-
paid, was one of the findings of the Brookings In-
stitution.
There is a very important feature of railroad costs
that has been overlooked by the carriers. The interest
on bonds is where the trouble lies. The writer sees no
good way out. For years, the roads have been losing
money on the interest they must pay. The bonds a rail-
road uses for capital have an interest rate of some-
where around five percent. They couldn't sell the bonds
if they were worth less, and the roads would not be
capitalized at all. The gross interest on these bonds in-
creases constantly, as more bonds are issued, while the
value of the road increases far more slowly. There is
no way to allow for depreciation on what the bond
bought in the way of equipment, and it is easier to pay
interest than amortize the bonds, so the bond value of
the railroads goes up higher and higher, and has already
left the real value of the property and equipment far
behind. In fact, it would be impossible to finance a road
with 5% bonds, simply because starting in 1933, and
running through 1938, the yearly return on the prop-
erty investment of Class I railroads has been: '33,
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1.83%; '34, 1.79%; '35, 1.94%; '36, 2.58%; '37,
2.27%; and as of August, 1938, .99%. So a railroad
just simply is not a 5% investment. The fact that de-
preciation is never figured has the result that on a cal-
endar put out by an association of railroads shows that
revenue from two whole months goes into interest
alone. Add to that the juggling of stocks and bonds bv
some of the prominent financial tycoons, and it is little
wonder that the carriers find themselves in a mess. One
road paid dividends on its stock only eight years of the
forty-four the stock has been issued. What could have
made the stock valuable except speculative possibilities?
In fact, that sort of thing is practically the only reason
for the existence of today's trouble. No one doubts that
the roads are in bad shape. Few will deny that the
financial coups of the past are responsible. Now, what
do we do?
The first possibility is reorganization. The writer
doubts whether that would do it. It might be possible
to adjust rates, wages, etc., so that an interest rate of,
say, 2% could be paid, and at the same time some money
set aside for amortization. That, though, would prob-
ably tie up too much capital. And anyhow, who would
want bonds bearing 2% interest? That rate would be
just about 5% on the depreciated property or equip-
ment. So it is an unfeasible plan.
Is government ownership! the way out? That remains
to be seen. From what the writer has seen, and he has
seen government owned and privately owned utilities,
the rates would probably double and there might still
be some left over for the taxpayer to pay; although on
the other hand, something like the mail service might
result, which would be quite satisfactory. The trouble
is that there is no good way for the government to
acquire the roads. That is the weakness of the Canadian
National, and would probably be ours. So that plan,
too, is really unfeasible, also.
The President has stated that there should be no
wage cut. It seems that he did right. His answer does
not solve a problem. It could not. Wages have little
to do with the financial worries of the roads. So the
crisis continues.
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